In 2025, the driver training industry in Latvia was marked by a pronounced crisis of trust in the public space. This was driven by several interconnected factors: low first-time exam pass rates, increasingly loud discussions about training quality, aggressive pricing campaigns, public suspicions regarding unethical instructor practices, and advertising communication where certain indicators were often used out of context.
From an outside perspective, two opposing messages were visible in the market at the same time. On one hand, driving schools promised a fast, cheap, and convenient path to obtaining a licence. On the other hand, state statistics and media reports showed that a large portion of students do not complete this path either quickly or cheaply, as the system involves too many repeated exams and additional driving lessons, leading to significant frustration.
The most significant negative background in 2025 was the exam statistics themselves. In LTV broadcasts and LSM publications, it was highlighted that only about one in three candidates in Riga pass the Category B driving test on their first attempt, and even repeated attempts show similar success rates. This indicates that the issue cannot be attributed solely to first-exam stress. CSDD representatives pointed out that if a person fails not only the first attempt but also multiple subsequent ones, it indicates systemic issues in training quality.
The negative narrative in 2025 was not limited to percentages. LSM and the programme “Aizliegtais paņēmiens” publicly concluded that some students are sent to exams without sufficient preparation. Juris Teteris, Head of the CSDD Qualification Department, noted that requirements for instructors have increased, but not all driving schools have fully adapted, and some instructors continue to operate using outdated approaches.
The same report also revealed one of the industry's shadow sides: training may be formally completed but practically insufficient. Additional negative perception was created by public statements about instructor performance. A representative of Einsteins Driving School explained in an LSM report that several instructors were dismissed because they were simply “driving clients around without purpose” and doing so excessively. Such statements reinforce suspicions of a conflict of interest: an instructor’s income may depend not on preparing a student efficiently for the exam, but on prolonging and increasing the cost of the training process.
In one of the most widely discussed programmes about the industry in 2025, references were made to potential schemes and unethical instructor behaviour. Although individual cases were not legally classified as violations, the public message was strong: there are practices within the industry that may be financially disadvantageous or psychologically harmful to clients. LSM also reported stories from new drivers about shouting, inappropriate remarks, and behaviour that further increases stress during exams.
Another visible shadow of the industry in 2025 was aggressive pricing communication. The market increasingly featured offers such as theory courses for 1 EUR, free theory training, discounted driving lessons, and even “wheel of fortune” style campaigns. While such marketing is not prohibited, it creates a market environment where communication resembles short-term promotional tactics rather than a responsible educational service selection process. From a reputational standpoint, the biggest risk is that attention is diverted from the total cost of obtaining a licence to a symbolic entry price, giving clients an incomplete understanding of the actual cost of the process.
From a legal perspective, such pricing policies may be formally compliant if conditions are disclosed (although contract samples are often not publicly available to consumers). From the consumer’s perspective, however, this creates confusion between advertised prices and actual final costs. This increases distrust across the entire industry, as it becomes more difficult for clients to compare services based on clear and fairly interpreted criteria.
In 2025, data became almost as sensitive a topic in the driving school industry as pricing. CSDD statistics are public and highly influential, making them a tempting tool for selective communication. Industry players used “TOP” rankings and first-time exam success rates in marketing without specifying time periods or training categories, thus lacking methodological transparency. Old or outdated data were sometimes presented as current, indicating manipulation and, in essence, misleading consumers.
If the industry publicly suggests that statistics may not be objective, trust collapses on two levels at once: clients no longer trust either the meaning of advertised figures or the system generating them. Therefore, the problem in 2025 was not only the data itself, but also how it was presented, contested, and used in competitive positioning.
Additional tension was created by theory exam results. In 2025, the number of candidates passing state theory exams on the first attempt continued to decline. This increased the gap between schools that provide high-quality content and those competing mainly on price. From a negative perspective, this makes the market even less transparent, as clients struggle to understand whether they are purchasing quality training or merely access to a test platform and marketing promises.
In 2025, perceptions of gender inequality in driving exams also added reputational pressure. LSM reported that women fail driving exams approximately 30% more often than men, despite men being responsible for the majority of serious accidents. CSDD denied that this is due to examiner bias.
In 2025, a clear structural contradiction was visible in the driving school industry. Public marketing was dominated by simple promises, low entry prices, discount codes, gamified campaigns, and percentage-based messaging. However, behind this façade lay a more complex reality: low first-time exam success rates, uneven training quality, public suspicions of unethical instructor practices, pricing structures that obscure the true cost for clients, and statistical communication where figures are often used as competitive tools rather than transparent information sources.
In recent years, the driving school industry on social media has increasingly turned into an entertainment platform — particularly leading schools compete for attention with jokes, memes, and light content. While communication becomes more superficial, real road safety indicators show little improvement — accident rates, violations, and fatalities remain high.
This suggests that the focus is shifting away from high-quality training and the development of safe driving skills toward the attention economy, where reach becomes more important than outcomes. As a result, the social responsibility of driving schools should be evaluated more critically, as both the industry’s reputation and overall public safety are affected.
A driving school is not just a formality on the way to obtaining a licence. It is a direct investment in safety, costs, and time. Based on publicly available information, contracts, communication, and training organisation analysed throughout 2025, several risk factors can be identified.
BAVA Driving School has experienced a significant drop from 4th place in the 2024 ranking to 1st place in the 2025 anti-ranking. This is not the “worst driving school” in the traditional sense — it represents the top of the highest-risk driving school category, where consumers should be particularly critical.
Based on observations and available data from 2025, BAVA Driving School stands out with a range of practices that may create the most significant risks for consumers — financially, in terms of training quality, and from a legal perspective.
It should be noted that BAVA Driving School ranked 2nd in the ANTI TOP based on year-long voting by portal users, while the other part of the evaluation was based on expert analysis.
Misleading and outdated information
For at least a year, exam statistics displayed on the homepage of bavaautoskola.lv were outdated. By the end of the year, real data differed by up to approximately 20%. Such discrepancies can be verified using CSDD monthly statistics and publicly available web archive data.
Additionally, the reviews published on the website are selected and posted by the school itself, meaning their authenticity and objectivity cannot be independently verified.
Selective data interpretation and positioning
Throughout the year, social media communication featured selective “top rankings”, positioning the school as one of the largest in Latvia, including claims of being the second largest.
However, according to CSDD data on the number of graduates in 2024–2025, BAVA ranks only 7th. This raises valid questions about the accuracy of communication and data interpretation. It should be noted that inconsistencies were also observed between monthly and aggregated CSDD data.
Aggressive price dumping and mismatch with actual offers
In 2025, BAVA активно used price dumping strategies for both theory and driving lessons. However, in practice, these offers may be difficult to access:
Furthermore, the contract clearly states that the school does not guarantee the lowest advertised price, meaning the advertised offer may be purely informational.
This creates a risk that the initial offer does not reflect actual costs.
Mismatch between digital positioning and actual performance
Public statements emphasise the superiority of the school’s digital solutions. However, 2025 CSDD data on e-learning platforms shows the school ranking last.
Legally questionable training organisation
A particularly important aspect is the organisation of payments for driving lessons.
According to Cabinet Regulation No. 358, payment for training must be made to the driving school. However, in practice, direct payments to instructors are allowed, creating several risks:
This means that part of the training process may take place outside full regulatory control.
Increased risk of losing training progress
If training is not properly registered or does not comply with regulations, students may face situations where:
Unreasonably intensive training schedule
Although regulations allow up to one year for theory learning, the contract sets a significantly shorter period (approximately 5 months) with multiple interim deadlines.
This may create excessive pressure on students and increase the risk of incomplete training.
Premature start of driving training
The contract allows driving lessons to begin after minimal payment, while regulations require basic theoretical knowledge.
This may affect:
Financially unfavourable contract terms
The contract states that:
Considering the advance payment structure, this creates significant financial risk for students.
Systemically limited instructor competition
The absence of an electronic driving scheduling system means:
Conclusion — the combination of these factors makes this driving school a choice that requires particularly careful evaluation before making a decision.
A driving school is not merely a formality on the way to obtaining a driving licence. It is a direct investment in safety, costs and time. In 2025, by analysing publicly available information, contracts, communication and the organisation of training, several risk factors can be identified.
In 2025, GROSS Driving School ranked 2nd in the Anti Top. This is not the “worst driving school” in the classical sense — it is a high-risk choice segment, where consumers need to carry out a particularly careful assessment.
Based on the observations and information available during 2025, GROSS Driving School stands out for a number of practices that may create significant risks for consumers — financially, in terms of training quality, and from a legal perspective.
Marketing communication and the interpretation of “free” offers
The driving school’s communication regularly emphasises the possibility of studying theory free of charge or with a huge discount. Although such an offer available 24/7/365 may seem attractive, it is misleadingly positioned as a unique advantage. At the same time, similar opportunities in the market have effectively already become standard practice.
This may create a distorted perception of the overall cost structure, because the main cost component in driving school services is traditionally practical driving training, not theory.
Hidden costs and lack of transparency in the pricing structure
A significant risk factor is the distribution of payments between the driving school and the instructor, which the learner is not always clearly informed about before starting the training.
In practice, this means:
Such a structure may significantly affect the overall costs and reduce transparency.
Restrictions on instructor choice and lack of competition
The training model often involves assigning the learner to a specific instructor.
This may lead to several consequences:
As a result, the learner may find themselves in a situation where the training process is not optimal in terms of either time or costs.
Legally unclear payment practice
As in other examples in the market, in practice payments directly to the instructor are allowed.
According to Cabinet Regulation No. 358, payment for training must be made to the driving school. If payments are made outside this system, there are risks:
In addition, the practice of concluding a separate agreement with the instructor is used, which creates further uncertainty:
Premature start of practical driving training
In the organisation of training, a tendency can be observed to start driving lessons at an early stage, when theoretical knowledge has not yet been sufficiently consolidated.
This may affect:
In practice, this may lead to a situation where theory is learned in parallel with driving, rather than serving as the foundation for high-quality training.
Lack of distance learning solutions
Unlike other major market participants, the driving school does not have its own fully developed distance learning product.
This may mean:
In modern conditions, where a digital learning environment is an important advantage, this factor is becoming increasingly significant.
Inaccuracies in contract terms and consumer risks
When analysing the structure of the contract, several potentially unfavourable aspects for the learner can be identified:
This may create a situation where the learner does not fully understand their obligations and possible risks.
Stability of training results
Publicly available data indicate average results in both theory and driving.
This in itself is not a critical factor, but in combination with other risks it may affect the overall effectiveness of training and the time required to achieve the result.
Final conclusion — the combination of factors — a non-transparent pricing structure, restricted instructor competition, legally unclear payment organisation, lack of digital solutions and contract-related risks — makes GROSS Driving School a choice that requires particularly careful assessment before making a decision.
A driving school is a direct investment in safety, costs and time. By analysing publicly available information, contracts, communication and the organisation of training, several risk factors in obtaining a driving licence can be identified.
In 2025, Credo Autoprieks Driving School ranked 4th in the Anti Top. This is not a “bad driving school” in the classical sense — it is a representative of a higher-risk segment, where consumers need to carry out a particularly critical assessment.
Based on the available information and market observations, the driving school stands out for several systemic factors that may affect costs, training quality and consumer safety.
Daily theory price dumping as an acquisition tool
The driving school’s communication regularly uses especially low prices or promotional offers for theory training, for example a significantly reduced price compared with the standard level — usually EUR 1 for the theory course.
This approach:
Considering that practical driving training accounts for the largest part of the costs, theory price dumping may be more of a marketing tool than real value for the customer.
Hidden customer fee and increase in total costs
When analysing the pricing structure, a model can be identified where:
This creates a situation where the learner does not always fully understand the overall cost structure.
In addition, publicly available information indicates that in certain cases, when choosing an instructor outside the system, an additional fee is applied, although this could be considered an industry standard.
Instructor assignment and restriction of competition
The training organisation uses a model where the learner is generally assigned to a specific instructor.
This may create:
If there is no effective internal competition between instructors in the market, both quality and efficiency suffer.
Lack of an electronic driving lesson system
Unlike the most modern market solutions, the driving school does not have a fully developed electronic driving lesson booking system for organising basic practical driving training, only for driving school exams.
This means:
In a digital environment, this is a significant factor for competitiveness and quality.
Risks of unlawful payment practices
As in other market cases, in practice payments directly to the instructor are allowed.
According to the regulatory framework, including Cabinet Regulation No. 358, payments must be made through the driving school. If this is not observed, there are risks:
Forced learning pace and premature promotion of practical driving training
The structure of the contract and training organisation may create a situation where:
This may affect:
In an optimal model, theory serves as the foundation and is not replaced by practice.
Contract terms and consumer risk
When analysing the contract approach, several potentially unfavourable aspects can be identified:
This may create a situation where the learner assumes greater obligations than they initially realise.
The impact of the driving school’s scale on the market
The scale of the driving school — a broad branch network and a large number of customers — also creates a systemic impact on the market:
In this case, Credo Autoprieks is rather not setting market trends, but more following other large market players. This means that the impact goes beyond the level of a single driving school.
Training results
Publicly available information indicates average results, despite an aggressive pricing and volume strategy.
This means that:
Final conclusion — the combination of factors — constant theory price dumping, a non-transparent pricing structure, instructor assignment, lack of digital solutions, legal risks and contract terms — makes this driving school a choice that requires particularly careful assessment before making a decision.
Obtaining a driving licence is not merely a formal process — it is a combination of safety, financial planning and time investment. This is why choosing a driving school is, in fact, a strategic decision rather than a spontaneous reaction to advertising or price. If one analyses not only the offer on the surface, but also the contracts, training organisation and communication approach, it becomes clear that the models of different driving schools differ significantly, and these differences directly affect the final result — how quickly, how well and at what cost a driving licence is obtained.
In the context of 2025, a particularly interesting case is Einšteins Driving School, which ranks 5th in the Anti Top. This position does not mean that the driving school is unable to provide quality training — rather, it reflects a complex combination of a very strong market position, effective marketing and, at the same time, a number of systemic factors that may be unfavourable to the consumer. A positive aspect should also be noted — compared with 2024, the driving school has made progress, especially in the area of contract terms, moving from a highly problematic model to an acceptable one. However, its influence on the market remains so significant that even partial improvements do not change the overall picture.
It should be noted that Einšteins Driving School ranked 1st in the ANTI TOP based on year-long voting by portal users, while the other part of the evaluation was based on expert analysis. However, proportionality in relation to the number of learners should also be taken into account. Along with the voting results, we also received very detailed complaints, for example, about the teaching style of the driving school’s leading theory instructor Marika Bērziņa in in-person lessons, the uninteresting and boring distance learning, as well as unsatisfactory experiences with certain instructors.
Market dumping as a deliberate strategy
As the largest market player, the driving school does not merely participate in competition — it significantly influences it.
In practice, this means that:
This model is effective in attracting customers, but at the same time it creates long-term risks both for consumers and for the market as a whole.
The reality of total costs and the perception of “expensiveness”
Once the training process has started, the real cost structure becomes apparent.
Additional cost elements:
As a result:
The key issue is that the problem is not only the price, but the fact that the total cost and time commitment are not fully communicated.
Very short theory learning deadlines
The driving school offers accelerated theory training, which may seem attractive at first glance.
However, this approach has side effects:
This creates a situation where speed at the beginning later turns into additional time and costs.
Instructor availability and process efficiency
The large number of customers affects practical training.
Consequences:
The scale effect is clearly visible here — size provides volume, but not always efficiency.
Digital service — one of the best in the market
At the same time, the driving school stands out with a strong digital environment.
This is one of the main reasons for the large number of customers.
However, it is important to understand:
Social responsibility and communication quality
Considering the scale of the driving school, its impact on society is significant.
However, its communication is dominated by:
As a result:
Training results
Public data show stable, but not outstanding, performance.
This means that:
Progress compared with 2024 and necessary improvements
Compared with 2024, Einšteins Driving School has made visible progress, and this cannot be ignored. The most significant changes concern the contract terms — they have become more correct, more understandable and generally closer to consumer interests. As a result, certain legal risks, which were previously one of the main points of criticism, have also decreased. The overall model has now become more structured and easier to understand, which in itself is a significant step in the right direction.
However, this progress relates more to improvements in “form” than to substantial changes in “content”. Several systemic factors that affect both the consumer and the market as a whole still remain. The high level of total costs has not changed significantly, and the pricing structure is still often not intuitively understandable.
The strong impact of dumping on the sector also continues, deforming price perception and affecting competition. Communication quality remains insufficient — especially in relation to explaining the real costs and time required. Considering the scale of the driving school, this impact becomes systemic rather than individual.
As a result, a contradictory profile emerges. On the one hand, it is a driving school with a very strong digital service, a more orderly legal environment and above-average training results. On the other hand, significant risks still remain: total costs are often high and insufficiently transparent, theory learning deadlines are short, various additional fee elements exist, and communication lacks sufficient social responsibility. The combination of these factors means that the driving school’s influence on the overall quality of the market remains very strong.